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Abstract
Cryptographic standards serve two important goals: making different implementations interoperable and avoid-
ing various known pitfalls in commonly used schemes. This chapter discusses Public-Key Cryptography Standards
(PKCS) which have significant impact on the use of public key cryptography in practice. PKCS standards are a set
of standards, called PKCS #1 through #15. These standards cover RSA encryption, RSA signature, password-based
encryption, cryptographic message syntax, private-key information syntax, selected object classes and attribute types,
certification request syntax, cryptographic token interface, personal information exchange syntax, and cryptographic
token information syntax. The PKCS standards are published by RSA Laboratories. Though RSA Laboratories so-
licits public opinions and advice for PKCS standards, RSA Laboratories retain sole decision-making authority on all
aspects of PKCS standards. PKCS has been the basis for many other standards such as S/MIME.
1 Introduction
Public key cryptography is based on asymmetric cryptographic algorithms that use two related keys, a public key and
a private key; the two keys have the property that, given the public key, it is computationally infeasible to derive the
private key. A user publishes his/her public key in a public directory such as an LDAP directory and keeps his/her
private key to himself/herself.
According to the purpose of the algorithm, there are public-key encryption/decryption algorithms and signature
algorithms. An encryption algorithm could be used to encrypt a data (for example, a symmetric key) using the public
key so that only the recipient who has the corresponding private key could decrypt the data. Typical public key
encryption algorithms are RSA and ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme, see, SECG 2000). A
signature algorithm together with a message digest algorithm could be used to transform a message of any length
using the private key to a signature in such a way that, without the knowledge of the private key, it is computationally
infeasible to find two messages with the same signature, to find a message for a pre-determined signature, or to find a
signature for a given message. Anyone who has the corresponding public key could verify the validity of the signature.
Typical public key digital signature algorithms are RSA, DSA, and ECDSA.
There have been extensive standardization efforts for public key cryptographic techniques. The major standards
organizations that have been involved in public key cryptographic techniques are:
• ISO/IEC. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) (individually and jointly) have been developing a series of standards for application-independent
cryptographic techniques. ISO has also been developing bank security standards under the ISO technical com-
mittee TC86–Banking and Related Financial Services.
• ANSI. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) have been developing public key cryptographic tech-
nique standards for financial services under Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. For example, they have
developed the standards ANSI X9.42 (key management using Diffie-Hellman), ANSI X9.44 (key establishment
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using factoring-based public key cryptography), and ANSI X9.63 (key agreement and key management using
ECC).
• NIST. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been developing public key cryptography
standards for use by US federal government departments. These standards are released in Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) publications.
• IETF. The Internet Engineering Task Force has been developing public key cryptography standards for use by
the Internet community. These standards are published in Requests for Comments (RFCs).
• IEEE. The IEEE 1363 working group has been publishing standards for public key cryptography, including
IEEE 1363-2000, IEEE 1363a, IEEE P1363.1, and IEEE P1363.2.
• Vendor-specific standards. This category includes PKCS standards that we will describe, SEC standards, and
others. Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) #1 and #2 are elliptic curve public key cryptography stan-
dards that have been developed by Certicom Corp. in cooperation with secure systems developers world-wide.
The PKCS standards, developed by RSA Laboratories (a Division of RSA Data Security Inc.) in cooperation with
secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography, are
widely implemented in practice, and periodically updated. Contributions from the PKCS standards have become part
of many formal and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 documents, IETF documents, and SSL/TLS (Secure Socket
Layer/Transport Layer Security). The parts and status of PKCS standards are listed in Table 1 and are discussed in
details in the following sections. The descriptions are largely adapted from the PKCS documents themselves. In
Section 13, we give an example application which uses all these PKCS standards.
Table 1: PKCS Specifications
No. PKCS title Comments
1 RSA Cryptography Standard
2,4 incorporated into PKCS #1
3 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard superseded by IEEE 1363a etc.
5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
6 Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard never adopted
7 Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard superseded by RFC 3369 (CMS)
8 Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
9 Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types
10 Certification Request Syntax Standard
11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard referred to as CRYPTOKI
12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
13 (reserved for ECC) never been published
14 (reserved for pseudo random number generation) never been published
15 Cryptographic Token Information Syntax Standard
2 PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS #1 v2.1 provides standards for implementing RSA algorithm-based public key cryptographic encryption schemes
and digital signature schemes with appendix. It also defines corresponding ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and
for identifying the schemes.
RSA is a public-key algorithm invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (1978) which is based on the exponenti-
ation modulo the product of two large prime numbers. The security of RSA algorithm is believed to be based on the
hardness of factoring the product of large prime numbers. In PKCS #1 v2.1, multiprime RSA scheme is introduced.
Multiprime RSA means that the modulus isn’t the product of two primes but of more than two primes. This is used
to increase performance of RSA cryptographic primitives. In particular, in multiprocessor environments, one can ex-
ponentiate modulo each prime and then apply the Chinese remainder theorem to get the final results. However, one
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should be aware that the security strength of multiprime RSA is a little different from the original RSA scheme. If we
assume that the best way to attack multiprime RSA is to factorize the modulus and the best factorization algorithm
is the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm, then we can compute the approximate strength of some multiprime RSA
schemes as listed in Table 2, where u is the number of primes. Similar tables for two primes RSA could be found in
literatures, e.g., Lenstra and Verheul (2001).
Table 2: Security strength of multiprime RSA schemes
Symmetric Key Size RSA Modulus Size u Symmetric Key Size RSA Modulus Size u
80 1024 2 192 7680 4
73 1024 3 175 7680 5
112 2335 3 158 7680 6
100 2335 4 144 7680 7
88 2335 5 125 7680 9
128 3072 3 256 15360 5
117 3072 4 235 15360 6
103 3072 5 215 15360 7
93 3072 6 199 15360 8
2.1 RSA keys
Let n = r1 · · · ru be the product of u ≥ 2 distinct prime numbers of approximately the same size (|n|/u bits each),
where |n| denotes the number of bits in n. For the case of u = 2, one normally uses p and q to denote the two
prime numbers, that is, n = pq. A typical size for n is 1024 bits, and u = 2. Let e, d be two integers satisfying
e · d ≡ 1 (mod χ(n)), where χ(n) is the least common multiple of r1 − 1, r2 − 1, . . . , ru − 1. We call n the RSA
modulus, e the encryption exponent, and d the decryption exponent. The pair (n, e) is the public key and the pair (n, d)
is called the secret key or private key. The public key is public and one can use it to encrypt messages or to verify
digital signatures. The private key is known only to the owner of the private key and can be used to decrypt ciphertexts
or to digitally sign messages.
In order to efficiently decrypt ciphertexts and to efficiently generate digital signatures, the private key may include
further information such as the first two prime factors and CRT exponents and CRT coefficients of each prime factor.
For a prime factor ri, its CRT exponent is a number di satisfying e · di ≡ 1 (mod (ri − 1)), and its CRT coefficient ti
is a positive integer less than ri satisfying Ri · ti ≡ 1 (mod ri), where Ri = r1 · r2 · . . . · ri−1. PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies
the format for such kind of enhanced private keys.
2.2 RSA encryption schemes
We begin by describing a basic version of RSA encryption scheme. A message is an integer m < n. To encrypt m,
one computes c ≡ me mod n. To decrypt the ciphertext c, the legitimate receiver computes cd mod n. Indeed,
cd ≡ med ≡ m mod n,
where the last equality follows by Euler’s theorem.
For performance reasons, RSA is generally not used to encrypt long data messages directly. Typically, RSA is
used to encrypt a secret key and the data is encrypted with the secret key using a secret key cryptography scheme such
as DES or AES. Thus the actual data to be encrypted by RSA scheme is generally much smaller than the modulus
and the message (secret key) needs to be padded to the same length of the modulus before encryption. For example,
if AES-128 is used, then an AES key is 128 bits. Another reason for a standardized padding prior to encryption using
some randomness is that the basic version of RSA encryption scheme is not secure and is vulnerable to many attacks.
PKCS #1 v2.1 provides two message padding methods: EME-PKCS1-v1 5 and EME-OAEP.
2.2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-v1 5 padding
After EME-PKCS1-v1 5 padding to M , the padded message EM looks as follows:
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EM = 0x00 0x02 random octets 0x00 M
where “random octets” consists of pseudo-randomly generated nonzero octets and 0x00 octet is used to delimit the
padding from the actual data. The length of “random octets” is at least eight octets. The top octet 0x00 guarantees that
the padded message is smaller than the modulus n (PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies that the high-order octet of the modulus
must be non-zero). If the padded message EM were larger than n, decryption would produce EM mod n instead
of EM . The next octet 0x02 is the format type. The value 0x02 is used to encryption and the value 0x01 is used
for signature padding format RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 is no long recommended by RSA Lab.).
The resulting padded message EM is |n| bits and is directly encrypted using the basic version of RSA.
Bleichenbacher (1998) pointed out that improper implementation of the above padding method can lead to disas-
trous consequences. When the encrypted message arrives at the receiver’s computer, an application decrypts it, checks
the initial block, and strips off the random pad. However, some applications check for the two initial blocks 0x00
02 and if it is incorrect, they send the error message saying “invalid ciphertext”. These error messages can help the
attacker to decrypt ciphertext of his choice. PKCS #1 v2.1 recommends certain easily implemented countermeasures
to thwart this attack. Typical examples include the addition of structure to the data to be encoded, rigorous checking of
PKCS #1 v1.5 conformance in decrypted messages, and the consolidation of error messages in a client-server protocol
based on PKCS #1 v1.5.
2.2.2 RSAES-OAEP padding
EME-OAEP is based on Bellare and Rogaway’s (1995) Optimal Asymmetric Encryption scheme. Assuming that it is
difficult to inverse the RSA function and the mask generation function in the OAEP padding has appropriate properties,
RSAES-OAEP is proven to be secure in a stronger sense. The reader is referred to Bellare and Rogaway (1995) for
details.
Let k be the length in octets of the recipient’s RSA modulus, k0 < k be an integer, H be a hash function whose
outputs are k0-octets, and MGF be the mask generation function. For an input octet string x and an integer i, MGF(x, i)
outputs a string of i octets. Let M be the k1-octets message such that k1 < k − 2k0 − 2, and L be an optional
label (could be an empty string) to be associated with the message. EME-OAEP first converts the message M to a
(k − k0 − 1)-octets data block DB that looks as follows:
DB = H(L) random octets 0x01 M
where “random octets” consists of pseudo-randomly generated octets. The length of “random octets” could be zero.
EME-OAEP then chooses a random k0-octets string r, and generates the OAEP padded message EM as follows:
EM = 0x00 r ⊕ MGF(DB ⊕ MGF(r, k − k0 − 1), k0) DB ⊕ MGF(r, k − k0 − 1)
The resulting padded messageEM is k-octets and is directly encrypted using the basic version of RSA. For decryption
operations, EME-OAEP decoding method could be constructed directly.
2.3 RSA signature schemes with appendix
We begin by describing a basic version of RSA signature scheme with appendix. A message is an integer m < n.
To sign m, the owner of the private key (n, d) computes the signature s ≡ md mod n. To verify that s is a signature
on m from the legitimate owner of the private key (n, d), one uses the corresponding public key (n, e) to compute
m′ ≡ se (mod n). If m′ = m, then the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is invalid.
The basic version of RSA signature scheme can only generate signatures on messages less than |n| bits. In addition,
the basic version of RSA signature scheme is not secure. To address these issues, in practice, one first computes a
message digest from a given message using a hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1. The message digest is encoded
using an encoding method and the resulting string is converted to an integer and is supplied to the basic RSA signature
primitive.
PKCS #1 v2.1 provides two encoding methods for encoding message digests: EMSA-PKCS1-v1 5 encoding and
EMSA-PSS encoding. Correspondingly there are two signature schemes with appendix: RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1 5. Although no attacks are known against RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5, in the interest of increased robustness,
RSASSA-PSS is recommended for eventual adoption in new applications. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 is included in
PKCS #1 v2.1 for compatibility with existing applications and we will not discuss it here. EMSA-PSS is based on
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the work of Bellare and Rogaway’s (1996). Assuming that computing eth roots modulo n is infeasible and the hash
and mask generation functions in EMSA-PSS have appropriate properties, RSASSA-PSS provides secure signatures.
This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty of forging signatures can be directly related to the difficulty
of inverting the RSA function, provided that the hash and mask generation functions are viewed as black boxes or
random oracles. The reader is referred to Bellare and Rogaway’s (1996) for more details.
Let k be the length in octets of the RSA modulus, H be a hash function whose outputs are k0 octets (k0 < k), and
MGF be the mask generation function. For an input octet string x and an integer i, MGF(x, i) outputs a string of i
octets. Let M be the message to be signed. EMSA-PSS first constructs octet strings M ′ and DB as follows:
M ′ = 0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 H(M) salt , DB = PS 0x01 salt
where “salt” and “PS” consist of pseudo-randomly generated octets. The lengths of “salt” and “PS” could be zero, and
the length of DB is k − k0 − 1 octets.
EMSA-PSS then constructs the octet string EM ′ as follows:
EM ′ = DB ⊕ MGF(H(M ′), k − k0 − 1) H(M ′) 0xbc
Assume that the RSA modulus has |n| bits, then the encoded string EM is obtained by setting the leftmost 8k−|n|+1
bits of the leftmost octet in EM ′ to zero. The resulting encoded string EM is k octets and is directly signed using the
basic version of RSA signature scheme. The EMSA-PSS decoding process could to be constructed directly.
3 PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard (Outdated)
PKCS #3 v1.4 describes a method for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement, whereby two parties can agree
upon a secret key that is known only to them. PKCS #3 is superseded by modern treatment of key establishment
schemes specified in IEEE 1363a (2003), ANSI 9.42, ANSI X9.44, and ANSI X9.63 etc. Basically there are two types
of key establishment schemes:
1. Key agreement scheme: a key establishment scheme in which the keying data established is a function of
contributions provided by both entities in such a way that neither party can predetermine the value of the keying
data. Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is an example of this category.
2. Key transport scheme: a key establishment scheme in which the keying data established is determined entirely
by one entity. For example, one party chooses a random session key, encrypts it with the other party’s public
key, and sends the encrypted session key to the other party. The other party can then decrypt the session key.
A special case of key transport scheme is the key wrap scheme in which the session key is encrypted with a
pre-shared secret using a secret key cipher such as DES or AES.
4 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Standard
In many applications of public-key cryptography, user security is ultimately dependent on one or more secret text
values or passwords. For example, user’s private key is usually encrypted with a password and the encrypted private
key is kept in storage devices (see Section 7). However, there are two essential problems regarding to password
application: (1) A password is not directly applicable as a key to any conventional cryptosystem; (2) Passwords are
often chosen from a relatively small space. Thus special care is required to defend against search attacks. PKCS #5
provides a general mechanism to achieve an enhanced security for password-based cryptographic primitives, covering
key derivation functions, encryption schemes, message-authentication schemes, and ASN.1 syntax identifying the
techniques. It should be noted that other password based cryptographic techniques are currently under standardization
process in IEEE 1363.2.
4.1 Key derivation functions
A password-based key derivation function produces a key from a password, a random salt value, and an iteration count.
The salt is not secret and serves the purpose of producing a large set of keys for one given password, among which one
is selected at random according to the salt. An iteration count serves the purpose of increasing the cost of producing
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keys from a password, thereby also increasing the difficulty of attack. PKCS #5 v2.0 specifies two password-based
key derivation functions PBKDF1 and PBKDF2. PBKDF1 is included in PKCS #5 v2.0 only for compatibility with
existing applications following PKCS #5 v1.5, and is not recommended for new applications.
PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially unbounded.
However, the maximum length for the derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying pseudorandom
function. Let H be a pseudorandom function whose outputs are hLen octets, dkLen ≤ (232 − 1) × hLen be the
intended length in octets for the derived key, P be the password (an octet string), S be an eight-octet salt string, and
c be an iterating count. For each integer i, by repeatedly hashing the password, salts, etc., one gets a sequence of
hLen-octets strings:
U i
1
= H(P, S||INT(i)), U i
2
= H(P,U i
1
), . . . , U ic = H(P,U
i
c−1),
where INT(i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most significant octet first. Then one computes the hLen-octet
strings Ti = U i1 ⊕ U i2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ U ic for each i. The derived key is the first dkLen-octet of the string T1||T2||T3|| · · ·.
In another word, let l = ⌈dkLen/hLen⌉ be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key, rounding up,
and r = dkLen − (l − 1) × hLen be the number of octets in the last block. Then the dkLen-octet derived key
DK = PBKDF2(P, S, c, dkLen) looks as follows:
DK = T1 T2 · · · Tl[0..r − 1]
4.2 Encryption schemes
PKCS #5 v2.0 specifies two encryption schemes PBES1 and PBES2. PBES1 is included in PKCS #5 v2.0 only for
compatibility with PKCS #5 v1.5, and is not recommended for new applications. PBES2 combines the password-based
key derivation function PBKDF2 with an underlying encryption scheme E . Let M be the message to be encrypted,
P be the password, k be the key length in octets for E . For the PBES2 encryption, one first selects a salt S and an
iteration count c, then one computes the derived k octets key DK = PBKDF2(P, S, c, k). The ciphertext C for M is:
C = EDK(M). The decryption operation for PBES2 can be done similarly.
4.3 Message authentication schemes
In a password-based message authentication scheme, the MAC generation operation produces a message authentica-
tion code from a message under a password, and the MAC verification operation verifies the message authentication
code under the same password. PKCS #5 v2.0 defines the password-based message authentication scheme PBMAC1
which combines the password-based key derivation function PBKDF2 with an underlying message authentication
scheme A.
Let M be the message to be authenticated, P be the password, k be the key length in octets for A. For PB-
MAC1, one first selects a salt S and an iteration count c, then one computes the derived k octets key DK =
PBKDF2(P, S, c, k). The message authentication code T can be computed as T = A(M,DK). The MAC verifi-
cation operation for PBMAC1 can be done similarly.
5 PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard (Historic)
When PKCS #6 was drafted, X.509 was in version 1.0 and no extensions component was defined in the certificate.
An X.509 v3 certificate can contain information about a given entity in the extensions component. Since the
introduction of X.509 v3, the status of PKCS #6 is historic.
6 PKCS #7 and RFC 3369: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
PKCS #7 has been superseded by IETF RFC 3369 (Housley 2002): cryptographic message syntax (CMS), which is
the basis for the S/MIME specification. CMS defines the syntax that is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate,
or encrypt arbitrary message content. In particular, CMS describes an encapsulation syntax for data protection. The
syntax allows multiple encapsulations; one encapsulation envelope can be nested inside another. Likewise, one party
can digitally sign some previously encapsulated data. In the CMS syntax, arbitrary attributes, such as signing time,
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can be signed along with the message content, and other attributes, such as countersignatures, can be associated with
a signature. A variety of architectures for certificate-based key management (e.g., the one defined by the IETF PKIX
working group) are supported in CMS.
The CMS values are generated using ASN.1 with BER-encoding and are typically represented as octet strings.
When transmitting CMS values in systems (e.g., email systems) that do not support reliable octet strings transmission,
one should use additional encoding mechanisms that are not addressed in CMS.
CMS defines one protection content type, ContentInfo, as the object syntax for documents exchanged between
entities. ContentInfo encapsulates a single identified content type and the identified type may provide further encap-
sulation. A ContentInfo object contains two fields: contentType (object identifier) and content. CMS defines
six contentTypes: data, signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, and authenticated-data. Addi-
tional content types can be defined outside the CMS document. The type of content can be determined uniquely by
contentType. Figure 1 lists the value types in the content field for each CMS defined content type.
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Figure 1: CMS content types and their fields
In Figure 1, digestAlgorithms is collection of message digest algorithm identifiers. encapContentInfo is the signed
content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. signedAttrs, unsignedAttrs, unprotectedAttrs,
authAttrs, and unauthAttrs are sets of Attribute objects. An Attribute object is a sequence of two fields: attrType
(object identifier) and attrValues (set of values).
7 PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
The security of the public key cryptosystem is entirely dependent on the protection of the private keys. Generally, the
private keys are encrypted with password and stored in some storage medium. It is important to have a standard to
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store private keys so that one can move private keys from one system to another system without any trouble. PKCS #8
v1.2 describes a syntax for private-key information, which includes a private key for some public-key algorithm and
a set of attributes, and a syntax for encrypted private-key information. A password-based encryption algorithm (e.g.,
one of those described in PKCS #5) could be used to encrypt the private-key information.
Two objects PrivateKeyInfo and EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo are defined in this standard. A PrivateKeyInfo object
contains the fields: version, privateKeyAlgorithm, privateKey, and attributes (optional), where privateKeyAlgorithm
is the identifier of the private key algorithm, privateKey is the octet string representing the private key, and attributes
is a collection of attributes that are encrypted along with the private key. An EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object contains
two fields: encryptionAlgorithm and encryptedData, where encryptionAlgorithm identifies the algorithm under which
the private-key information is encrypted, and encryptedData is the octet string representing the result of encrypting the
private-key information.
In practice, the PrivateKeyInfo object is BER encoded into an octet string, which is encrypted with the secret key
to give the encryptedData field of the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object.
8 PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types
In order to support PKCS-defined attributes (e.g., to store PKCS attributes in a directory service) in directory systems
based on LDAP and the X.500 family of protocols, PKCS #9 v2.0 defines two auxiliary object classes, pkcsEntity and
naturalPerson. PKCS attributes could be packaged into these two object classes and be exported to other environments
such as LDAP directory systems. PKCS #9 v2.0 also defines some new attribute types and matching rules that could
be used in other PKCS standards. For example, it defines challengePassword and extensionRequest attribute types to
be used in PKCS #10 attribute field, and it defines some attribute types to be used in PKCS #7 (CMS) signedAttrs,
unsignedAttrs, unprotectedAttrs, authAttrs, and unauthAttrs fields (see Section 6). All ASN.1 object classes, attributes,
matching rules and types defined in PKCS #9 v2.0 are exported for use in other environments.
The pkcsEntity object class is a general-purpose auxiliary object class that is intended to hold attributes about
PKCS-related entities. A pkcsEntity object class contains fields:
pkcsEntity = KIND (auxiliary type) PKCSEntityAttributeSet (optional) ID
The PKCSEntityAttributeSet may contain any of the following attributes: pKCS7PDU (with syntax ContentInfo),
userPKCS12 (with syntax PFX), pKCS15Token (PKCS #15), encryptedPrivateKeyInfo (PKCS #8), and future ex-
tensions. These attributes should be used when the corresponding PKCS data (e.g., CMS signed, or enveloped data;
PKCS #12 personal identity information data; PKCS #8 encrypted private key data, etc.) are stored in a directory
service.
The naturalPerson object class is a general-purpose auxiliary object class that is intended to hold attributes about
human beings. A naturalPerson object class contains fields:
naturalPerson = KIND (auxiliary type) NaturalPersonAttributeSet (optional) ID
The NaturalPersonAttributeSet may contain any of the following (or future extensions) attributes.
emailAddress countryOfCitizenship countryOfResidence pseudonym placeOfBirth
serialNumber unstructuredAddress unstructuredName gender dateOfBirth
PKCS #9 also defines two matching rules pkcs9CaseIgnoreMatch and signingTimeMatch which are used to deter-
mine whether two PKCS #9 attribute values are the same. Attribute types defined in PKCS #9 that are useful in other
standards are listed in Table 3.
Table 3: PKCS #9 Attribute types for use in other standards
Standard Name Attribute types
PKCS #7 and CMS contentType, messageDigest, signingTime, sequenceNumber, random-
Nonce, and counterSignature (with syntax SignerInfo)
PKCS #10 challengePassword (with syntax DirectoryString) and extensionRequest
(imported from ISO/IEC 9594-8 (1997))
PKCS #12 and #15 (user) friendlyName and localKeyId
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9 PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard
PKCS #10 v1.7 specifies syntax for certificate request. When one entity wants to get a public key certificate, the entity
constructs a certificate request and sends it a certification authority, which transforms the request into an X.509 public-
key certificate. A certification authority fulfills the request by authenticating the requesting entity and verifying the
entity’s signature, and, if the request is valid, constructing an X.509 certificate from the distinguished name and public
key, the issuer name, and the certification authority’s choice of serial number, validity period, and signature algorithm.
If the certification request contains any PKCS #9 attributes, the certification authority may also use the values in these
attributes as well as other information known to the certification authority to construct X.509 certificate extensions.
PKCS #10 does not specify the forms that the certification authority returns the new certificate. A certificate request
is constructed with the following steps:
1. Construct a CertificationRequestInfo object containing fields: version, subject, subjectPKInfo, and attributes,
where subject contains the entity’s distinguished name and subjectPKInfo contains the entity’s public key. Some
attribute types that might be useful here are defined in PKCS #9. An example is the challengePassword attribute,
which specifies a password by which the entity may request certificate revocation. Another example is informa-
tion to appear in X.509 certificate extensions.
2. Sign the CertificationRequestInfo object with the subject entity’s private key.
3. Construct a CertificationRequest object containing fields: CertificationRequestInfo, signatureAlgorithm, and
signature, where signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier, and signature contains the en-
tity’s signature.
10 PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard
PKCS #11 v2.20 specifies an application programming interface (API), called “Cryptoki”, to devices which hold
cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki, pronounced “crypto-key” and short for
“cryptographic token interface”, follows a simple object-based approach, addressing the goals of technology inde-
pendence (any kind of device) and resource sharing (multiple applications accessing multiple devices), presenting to
applications a common, logical view of the device called a “cryptographic token”. Cryptoki was intended from the
beginning to be an interface between applications and all kinds of portable cryptographic devices, such as those based
on smart cards, PCMCIA cards, and smart diskettes. The primary goal of Cryptoki was a lower-level programming
interface that abstracts the details of the devices, and presents to the application a common model of the cryptographic
device, called a “cryptographic token” (or simply “token”).
PKCS #11 v2.20 specifies the data types and functions available to an application requiring cryptographic services
using the ANSI C (1990) programming language. These data types and functions will typically be provided via C
header files by the supplier of a Cryptoki library. Generic ANSI C header files for Cryptoki are available from the
PKCS Web page.
Cryptoki isolates an application from the details of the cryptographic device. The application does not have to
change to interface to a different type of device or to run in a different environment; thus, the application is portable.
Cryptoki is intended for cryptographic devices associated with a single user, so some features that might be in-
cluded in a general-purpose interface are omitted. For example, Cryptoki does not have a means of distinguishing
multiple users. The focus is on a single user’s keys and perhaps a small number of certificates related to them.
Moreover, the emphasis is on cryptography. While the device may perform useful non-cryptographic functions, such
functions are left to other interfaces.
Cryptoki is likely to be implemented as a library supporting the functions in the interface, and applications will
be linked to the library. An application may be linked to Cryptoki directly; alternatively, Cryptoki can be a so-called
shared library (or dynamic link library), in which case the application would link the library dynamically. The dynamic
approach certainly has advantages as new libraries are made available, but from a security perspective, there are some
drawbacks. In particular, if a library is easily replaced, then there is the possibility that an attacker can substitute a
rogue library that intercepts a user’s PIN. From a security perspective, therefore, direct linking is generally preferable,
although code-signing techniques can prevent many of the security risks of dynamic linking. In any case, whether the
linking is direct or dynamic, the programming interface between the application and a Cryptoki library remains the
same. Figure 2 describes the general cryptoki model.
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Figure 2: General CryptoKi Model
Cryptoki defines general data types, objects, and functions. The general data types include general informa-
tion data types (e.g., CK VERSION and CK INFO), slot and token types (e.g., CK SLOT ID), session types (e.g.,
CK SESSION HANDLE), object types (e.g., CK OBJECT CLASS), data types for mechanisms (e.g., CK MECHANISM INFO),
function types (e.g., CK FUNCTION LIST), and locking-related types (e.g., CK CREATEMUTEX).
Cryptoki’s logical view of a token is a device that stores objects and can perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki
recognizes three classes of objects, as defined in the CK OBJECT CLASS data type: data, certificates, and keys. An
object consists of a set of attributes, each of which has a given value. A key object stores a cryptographic key. The
key may be a public key, a private key, or a secret key; each of these types of keys has subtypes for use in specific
mechanisms (cryptographic algorithms). For example, public key objects (object class CKO PUBLIC KEY) hold
public keys and contains the following common attributes:
CKA ID CKA KEY TYPE CKA DERIVE CKA KEY GEN MECHANISM
CKA WRAP CKA END DATE CKA LOCAL CKA KEY ALLOWED MECHANISM
CKA VERIFY CKA SUBJECT CKA TRUSTED CKA WRAP TEMPLATE
CKA ENCRYPT CKA START DATE CKA CHECK VALUE CKA VERIFY RECOVER
According to their lifetime, objects are classified as “token objects” and “session objects”. Further classification
defines access requirements. “PIN” or token-dependent methods are required to access “private token” while no
restriction is put on “public tokens”.
In addition to the PIN protection to private objects on a token, protection to private keys and secret keys can be
given by marking them as sensitive or unextractable. Sensitive keys cannot be revealed in plaintext off the token,
and unextractable keys cannot be revealed off the token even when encrypted (though they can still be used as keys).
It is expected that access to private, sensitive, or unextractable objects by means other than Cryptoki (e.g., other
programming interfaces, or reverse engineering of the device) would be difficult. Cryptoki does not consider the
security of the operating system by which the application interfaces to it. For example, since the PIN may be passed
through the operating system, a rogue application on the operating system may be able to obtain the PIN.
Cryptoki provides functions for creating, destroying, and copying objects in general, and for obtaining and mod-
ifying the values of their attributes. Objects are always well-formed in Cryptoki. That is, an object always contains
all required attributes, and the attributes are always consistent with the one from the time the object is created. This
contrasts with some object-based paradigms where an object has no attributes other than perhaps a class when it is
created, and is uninitialized for some time. In Cryptoki, objects are always initialized.
Cryptoki defines thirteen categories of functions: general-purpose functions (4 functions including C Initialize
and C Finalize), slot and token management functions (9 functions), session management functions (8 functions),
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object management functions (9 functions), encryption functions (4 functions), decryption functions (4 functions),
message digesting functions (5 functions), signing and MACing functions (6 functions), functions for verifying sig-
natures and MACs (6 functions), dual-purpose cryptographic functions (4 functions), key management functions (5
functions), random number generation functions (2 functions), and parallel function management functions (2 func-
tions). In addition to these functions, Cryptoki can use application-supplied callback functions to notify an application
of certain events, and can also use application-supplied functions to handle mutex objects for safe multi-threaded
library access.
Cryptoki has two user types: Security Officer (SO) and normal user. The function of SO is to initiate a token and
to set the PIN for the normal user. Only the normal user has access to private objects in the token.
A mechanism specifies precisely how a certain cryptographic process is to be performed (e.g., a digital signature
process or a hashing process). Cryptoki defines mechanisms for almost all available cryptographic operations that are
currently used in the industry.
An application in a single address space becomes a “Cryptoki application” when one of its running threads calls
the cryptoki function C Initialize and it ceases to be the “Cryptoki application” by calling the cryptoki function
C Finalize. Cryptoki has support mechanisms for multi-threading access.
Cryptoki requires that an application open one or more sessions with a token to gain access to the token’s objects
and functions. A session can be a read/write (R/W) session or a read-only (R/O) session. R/W and R/O refer to the
access to token objects, not to session objects. In both session types, an application can create, read, write and destroy
session objects, and read token objects. Table 4 lists session events.
Table 4: Session events
Event Occurs when...
Log In SO the SO is authenticated to the token.
Log In User the normal user is authenticated to the token
Log Out the application logs out the current user (SO or normal user)
Close Session the application closes the session or closes all sessions
Device Removed the device underlying the token has been removed from its slot
Cryptoki header files define a large array of data types. Certain packing- and pointer-related aspects of these types
are platform- and compiler-dependent; these aspects are therefore resolved on a platform-by-platform (or compiler-by-
compiler) basis outside of the Cryptoki header files by means of preprocessor directives. These directives are described
in the Cryptoki also.
11 PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
PKCS #12 v1.0 describes a transfer syntax for personal identity information, including private keys, certificates,
miscellaneous secrets, and extensions. Machines, applications, browsers, Internet kiosks, and so on, that support this
standard will allow a user to import, export, and exercise a single set of personal identity information. PKCS #12 can
be viewed as building on PKCS #8 by including essential but ancillary identity information along with private keys
and by instituting higher security through public-key privacy and integrity modes.
There are four combinations of privacy modes and integrity modes. The privacy modes use encryption (public-
key based or password based) to protect personal information from exposure, and the integrity modes (public-key
digital signature based or password message authentication code based) protect personal information from tampering.
For example, in public-key privacy mode, personal information on the source platform is enveloped using the trusted
encryption public key of a known destination platform and the envelop is opened using the corresponding private-key.
Though all combinations of privacy and integrity modes are permitted, certain practices should still be avoided.
For example, it is unwise to transport private keys without physical protection when using password privacy mode. In
general, it is preferred that the source and destination platforms have trusted public/private key pairs usable for digital
signatures and encryption, respectively. When trusted public/private key pairs are not available, password modes for
privacy and integrity could be used.
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The top-level exchange PDU (Protocol Data Unit) in PKCS #12 is called PFX. A PFX has three fields: version,
authSafe, and macData (optional), where authSafe is a PKCS #7 ContentInfo. Figure 3 describes the structure of the
PFX object.
... ...
SafeBag
SafeBag
SafeContents
safeContentBag
crlBagcertBag
pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag
keyBag
password mode
public key mode
AuthenticatedSafe
public key integrity mode
password integrity modePFX
iterations (integer)
macSalt
mac (DigestInfo) content
contentType=data
content
contentType=signedData
macData (optional)
authSafe
version
bagAttributes (optional)
bagID
bagValue
content
contentType=encrypted−data
content
contentType=enveloped−data
content
contentType=data
... ...
contentInfo
contentInfo
Figure 3: PFX object structure
It is straightforward to create PFX PDUs from the structure described in Figure 3. The data wrapped in the PFX could
be imported by reversing the procedure for creating a PFX.
12 PKCS #15: Cryptographic Token Information Syntax Standard
Cryptographic tokens, such as Integrated Circuit Cards (or IC cards) are intrinsically secure computing platforms
ideally suited to providing enhanced security and privacy functionality to applications. They can handle authentication
information such as digital certificates and capabilities, authorizations and cryptographic keys. Furthermore, they are
capable of providing secure storage and computational facilities for sensitive information such as private keys and
key fragments. At the same time, many of these tokens provide an isolated processing facility capable of using this
information without exposing it within the host environment where it is at potential risk from hostile code (viruses,
Trojan horses, and so on). Unfortunately, the use of these tokens for authentication and authorization purposes has
been hampered by the lack of interoperability. First, the industry lacks standards for storing a common format of
digital credentials (keys, certificates, etc.) on them. This has made it difficult to create applications that can work with
credentials from a variety of technology providers. Second, mechanisms to allow multiple applications to effectively
share digital credentials have not yet reached maturity.
PKCS #15 is a standard intended to enable interoperability among components running on various platforms
(platform neutral), to enable applications to take advantage of products and components from multiple manufacturers
(vendor neutral), to enable the use of advances in technology without rewriting application-level software (application
neutral), and to maintain consistency with existing, related standards while expanding upon them only where necessary
and practical. As a practical example, the holder of an IC card containing a digital certificate should be able to present
the card to any application running on any host and successfully use the card to present the contained certificate to the
application. As a first step to achieve these objectives, PKCS #15 v1.1 specifies a file and directory format for storing
security-related information on cryptographic tokens.
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The PKCS #15 token information may be read when a token is presented, and is used by a PKCS #15 interpreter
which is part of the software environment, e.g., as shown in the Figure 4.
Interface
Card Terminal
Interface
PKCS #11
Application
Interpreter
PKCS #15
Driver
Application
independent
Card
Figure 4: Embedding of a PKCS #15 interpreter (example)
PKCS #15 v1.1 defines four general classes of objects: Keys, Certificates, Authentication Objects and Data Ob-
jects. All these object classes have sub-classes, e.g. Private Keys, Secret Keys and Public Keys, whose instantiations
become objects actually stored on cards. Objects can be private, meaning that they are protected against unauthorized
access, or public. In the IC card case, access (read, write, etc) to private objects is defined by Authentication Objects
(which also includes Authentication Procedures). Conditional access (from a cardholder’s perspective) is achieved
with knowledge-based or biometric user information. In other cases, such as when PKCS #15 is implemented in
software, private objects may be protected against unauthorized access by cryptographic means. Public objects are
not protected from read-access. Whether they are protected against modifications or not depends on the particular
implementation.
In general, an IC card file format specifies how certain abstract, higher level elements such as keys and certificates
are to be represented in terms of more lower level elements such as IC card files and directory structures. A typical IC
card supporting PKCS #15 has the file structure layout as in Figure 5, where the following abbreviations are used: MF
(master file), DF(x) (dedicated file x), and EF(x) (elementary file x).
EF(ODF)
EF(TokenInfo)
EF(AODF)
EF(CDF)
EF(PrKDF)
MF
Other DFs/EFs
DF(PKCS#15)
EF(DIR)
Figure 5: Typical PKCS #15 Card Layout and Contents of DF(PKCS15)
PKCS #15 defines syntax for application directory contents as in Table 5. PKCS #15 compliant IC cards should
support direct application selection as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 Section 9 and ISO-IEC 7816-5 Section 6 (the full
AID is to be used as parameter for a “SELECT FILE” command). The operating system of the card must keep track
of the currently selected application and only allow the commands applicable to that particular application while it is
selected. The Application Identifier (AID) data element consists 12 bytes and its contents is defined in PKCS #15.
Objects could be created, modified, and removed from the object directory file on a card. ASN.1 syntax for these
objects have also been specified in PKCS #15.
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Table 5: Application Directory Contents
EF(ODF) an Object Directory File (ODF) contains pointers to other EFs (PrKDFs, PuKDFs,
SKDFs, CDFs, DODFs, and AODFs)
EF(PrKDF) a Private Key Directory File (PrKDF) contains (references to) private keys
EF(PuKDF) a Public Key Directory File (PuKDF) contains (references to) public keys
EF(SKDF) a Secret Key Directory File (SKDF) contains (references to) secret keys
EF(CDF) a Certificate Directory File (CDF) contains (references to) certificates
EF(DODF) a Data Object Directory File (DODF) is for data objects other than keys or certificate
EF(AODF) an Authentication Object Directory File (AODF) is for authentication objects such as
PINs, passwords, and biometric data
EF(TokenInfo) a mandatory TokenInfo with transparent structure contains generic information about
the card (e.g., card serial number, supported file types, algorithms implemented on the
card) and it’s capabilities
EF(UnusedSpace) an UnusedSpace file with transparent structure is used to keep track of unused space
in already created elementary files
other EFs in the PKCS #15 directory contains the actual values of objects (such as
private keys, public keys, secret keys, certificates and application specific data) refer-
enced from within PrKDFs, SKDFs, PuKDFs, CDFs or DODFs
13 An Example
We conclude this chapter with an example application of different PKCS standards. Assume that we want to implement
a smart card authentication system based on public key cryptography technology. Each user will be issued a smart card
containing user’s private key, public key certificate, and other personal information. Users can authenticate themselves
to different computing systems (or banking systems) by inserting their smart cards into card readers attached to these
computing systems and typing the password (or PIN).
RSA cryptographic primitives specified in PKCS #1 could be chosen as the underlying cryptographic mechanisms.
First, user Alice needs to register herself to the system to get her smart card. In the registration process, the system
first generates a public-key/private-key pair for Alice. Using PKCS #9, the system may create a naturalPerson object
or a few attributes containing Alice’s personal information. These information can then be used to generate a Certifi-
cateRequest object according to PKCS#10. The system can then send the CertificateRequest object to the Certificate
Authorities (CA) enveloped using CMS (PKCS #7). After the identity information verification, the CA signs Alice’s
public key to generate a certificate for Alice and sends it back to the system. After receiving Alice’s certificate from
the CA, the system can now build a smart card for Alice. Using Alice’s password (PIN), the system generates an En-
cryptedPrivateKeyInfo object for Alice according to PKCS #8 and PKCS #9 (PKCS #5 is also used in this procedure).
PKCS #12 may then be used to transfer Alice’s encrypted private key and personal information from one computer
to another computer (e.g., from a server machine to the smart card making machine). Using the dedicated file format
DF(PKCS#15), Alice’s encrypted private key object EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo, certificate, and other personal infor-
mation could be stored on the smart card. The card is now ready for Alice to use! At the same time, Alice may also
get a copy of these private information on a USB memory stick. These personal information is stored on the memory
stick according to PKCS #12.
Since all computing systems (e.g., different platforms from different vendors) support PKCS #11 API, when Alice
insert her card into an attached card reader, applications on these computing systems can communicate smoothly with
Alice’s smart card. In particular, after typing password (PIN), Alice’s smart card can digitally sign challenges from
these computing systems and these computing systems can verify Alice’s signature using the certificate presented by
Alice’s smart card. Thus Alice can authenticate herself to these systems.
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Glossary
1. AES A secret key cipher, as defined in FIPS PUB 197 (2001)
2. ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation One, as defined in ISO/IEC 8824-1,2,3,4 (1995)
3. Attribute An ASN.1 type that identifies an attribute type (by an object identifier) and an associated attribute
value
4. BER Basic Encoding Rules, as defined in X.690 (1994)
5. cryptoki Short for “cryptographic token interface”
6. DES and Triple DES Secret key ciphers, as defined in FIPS PUB 46-3 (1999)
7. ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
8. Key derivation function A function that produces a derived key from a base key and other parameters
9. LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, as defined in Hodges and Morgan (2002)
10. MAC scheme A MAC scheme is a cryptographic scheme consisting of a message tagging operation and a tag
checking operation which is capable of providing data origin authentication and data integrity
11. MD5 A cryptographic hash function, as defined in Rivest (1992). MD5 reduces messages of any length to
message digests of 128 bits
12. OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
13. octet An octet is a bit string of length 8. An octet is represented by a hexadecimal string of length 2. For
example 0x9D represents the bit string 10011101
14. octet string An octet string is an ordered sequence of octets
15. PDU Protocol Data Unit, which is a sequence of bits in machine-independent format constituting a message in
a protocol
16. personal identity information Personal information such as private keys, certificates, and miscellaneous secrets
17. PKCS #11 Token The logical view of a cryptographic device defined by Cryptoki
18. PKCS #15 elementary file Set of data units or records that share the same file identifier, and which cannot be a
parent of another file
19. PKCS #15 directory (DIR) file Elementary file containing a list of applications supported by the card and
optional related data elements
20. SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 Cryptographic hash function functions, as defined in FIPS PUB
180-2, (2002). SHA-1 (SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, respectively) reduces messages of any length to
message digests of 160 bits (256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits, respectively)
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